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UNIVERSITY OF UTAH V. UNIVERSITY OF 
MASSACHUSETTS: AN “INAPPROPRIATE” 
RELIANCE ON CAHILL 
William P. DeCotiis 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Justice Rehnquist, discussing the Supreme Court’s original and 
exclusive jurisdiction once wrote “[t]he absence of limiting 
principles . . . I fear, ‘could well pave the way for putting this Court into 
a quandary whereby we must opt either to pick and choose 
arbitrarily . . . or devote truly enormous portions of our energies to 
such matters.’”1 
On August 19, 2013, the Federal Circuit found itself in the 
quandary Justice Rehnquist perceptively foresaw, in the form of an 
inventorship dispute entitled University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft 
zur Forderung der Wissenschaften e.V (Max-Planck).  In the case, a state 
university, The University of Utah (“UUtah”), sought to sue another 
state university, the University of Massachusetts (UMass), over the 
inventorship status of patented RNAi technology.  Because UUtah and 
UMass are both arms of their respective states, such an action 
effectively amounts to the State of Utah suing the State of 
Massachusetts. 
A suit between two states falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court.  In an effort to avoid the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, UUtah named UMass officials as defendants 
rather than UMass.2  The district court accepted jurisdiction over the 
case, and on appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2012, Seton Hall 
University.  This paper is dedicated to my three grandfathers, Daniel C. DeCotiis, Esq., 
Vincent T. Frank, Esq., and Achilles Perry, whose unmatched character and intellect I 
seek always to emulate.  I would like to thank my family and friends for their unyielding 
love and support which makes all that I do possible.   
 1  Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 770 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(citing Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 504 (1971)).   
 2  University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der 
Wissenschaften e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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properly exercised its jurisdiction over the dispute.3  In justifying the 
exercise of jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit imposed limits on the 
Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, derived primarily from the 
Second Circuit case of Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill.4  The 
imposed limits, however, lacked solid footing in Supreme Court 
precedent and, as a result, the court misapplied foundational legal 
doctrine.  Furthermore, in order to prevent the case from being 
dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party, the Federal Circuit 
found that UMass was not an indispensable party despite having 
ownership rights in the patent-at-issue, citing a narrow exception the 
Ninth Circuit created in the case of Dainippon Screen Manufacturing Co.5  
Thus, by attempting to impose arbitrary limitations on the Supreme 
Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit placed widely 
accepted joinder rules in a precarious position. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the relevant legal doctrine at 
issue.  Part III of this Comment analyzes the reasoning of Max-Planck 
and undertakes a review of the underlying reasoning in Cahill and 
Dainippon.  Part IV of this Comment argues for a statutory exception 
that permits patent disputes concerning ownership to be vindicated 
between state universities in lower courts.  Alternatively, this part 
argues that Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Cahill be adopted as the 
proper statutory analysis for interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)—which 
sets forth the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.  Part V 
concludes. 
II. RELEVANT LEGAL DOCTRINE 
A. Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under 28 
U.S.C. § 1251 and Sovereign Immunity 
Article II § 2 cl. 2 of the United States Constitution provides for 
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over controversies between 
states:6 “[i]n all Cases . . . in which a State shall be a Party, the 
[S]upreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.”7  Original 
jurisdiction is limited statutorily to areas in which the Supreme Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) and areas in which 
the Supreme Court has original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction under 
 
 3  Id. at 1328.   
 4  Id. at 1322. 
 5  Id. at 1327.   
 6  Id. at 1320.   
 7  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.   
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28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3).8  According to § 1251(a), “[t]he Supreme 
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies 
between two or more states.”9  Under § 1251(b)(3), by contrast, the 
“Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of . . . 
[a]ll actions or proceedings by a state against the citizens of another 
State or against aliens.”10  Thus, in the context of Max-Planck, naming 
UMass (the State of Massachusetts) a party to the suit against UUtah 
(the State of Utah) invoked the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court and statutorily permitted only the Supreme Court to exercise 
jurisdiction over the dispute.  Conversely, under § 1251(b)(3), if a state 
sues a citizen of another state—i.e., UUtah sues a resident of another 
state—the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction is not invoked, and 
the district court may exercise jurisdiction. 
Outside of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
provided in § 1251(a), states and state actors are immune from suit 
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.  The Eleventh Amendment 
provides, in pertinent part: “[t]he Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens 
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”11  
Thus generally, a state, or an officer of a state acting in his or her 
official capacity, is immune from suit.  Consequently, in the context of 
patents, a state can neither be sued for infringement nor forced to 
defend against an action for a declaratory judgment because it is 
immune from suit.12 
As mentioned supra, states do not enjoy sovereign immunity from 
suits other states bring; rather, such disputes fall within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.13  States can also sue citizens of 
other states without raising issues of sovereign immunity and without 
invoking the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.14  Thus, in the 
context of Max-Planck, UUtah (the State of Utah) could sue UMass 
(the State of Massachusetts) in the Supreme Court of the United States 
under § 1251(a), and UUtah (the State of Utah) could sue a private 
citizen (or corporation) of Massachusetts if such citizen were an owner 
 
 8  28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).  
 9   Id.   
 10  Id. § 1251(b)(3).  
 11  U.S. CONST. amend. XI.   
 12  Id.  See also A123 Sys. Inc. v. Hydro-Que., 626 F.3d 1213, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 13  University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der 
Wissenschaften e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  See also Texas v. New 
Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130 (1984).   
 14  Id. at 1319–20. 
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of a disputed patent.  But under the Eleventh Amendment, UUtah 
theoretically cannot sue a state official acting within the scope of his or 
her official capacity (as UUtah did by naming UMass officials rather 
than UMass) outside of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court because suing an official is akin to suing the state itself. 
B. Ex Parte Young Doctrine 
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court created a narrow exception 
to sovereign immunity, which allows a federal court to treat 
unconstitutional, official acts of state officers as being separate from 
state action, so that the officers can be enjoined without being barred 
by a state’s sovereign immunity.15  Thus, in the context of Max-Planck, 
UUtah theoretically should only be able to sue a state officer for official 
acts if such official acts are unconstitutional.  In Max-Planck, there is no 
suggestion that the actions of UMass officials were unconstitutional. 
C. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) Indispensability 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, a party is required to 
be joined if feasible,16 and if the party cannot be joined, the court must 
determine whether “in equity and good conscience, the action should 
proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.”17  Factors 
a court is to consider in making this determination are: 
(1) The extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s 
absence might prejudice that person or the existing 
parties; 
(2) The extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or 
avoided by: 
(A) Protective provisions in the judgment; 
(B) Shaping the relief; or 
(C) Other measures; 
(3) Whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence   
would be adequate; and 
(4) Whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if 
the action were dismissed for non-joinder.18 
The court in Max-Planck found that UMass was not an indispensable 
party, despite the fact that UMass had ownership rights in the patent 
and that any judgment would directly alter the allocation of ownership 
over the patent. 
 
 15  Id. at 1321.  
 16  FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).  
 17  FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).  
 18  Id.  
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III. RELEVANT CASE LAW 
A. Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill 
i. Procedural history 
In Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed a suit brought 
by Connecticut (Plaintiff-Appellant) for declaratory and injunctive 
relief against John P. Cahill and Donald W. Brewer (Defendant-
Appellees), ruling that the suit was a “controversy between two or more 
States falling within the Supreme Court’s original and exclusive 
jurisdiction under § 1251(a).”19 
ii. Facts 
The dispute in Cahill arose out of the enforcement of New York’s 
Environmental Conservation Law.20  Under the law, residents of New 
York, or states that awarded reciprocal permits to New York residents, 
could obtain New York commercial permits for lobstering, but only 
New York residents were permitted to take lobsters from designated 
areas of New York waters in Long Island Sound near Fishers Island.21  
In November 1997, Gordon C. Colvin, Director of Marine Resources 
for the New York Department of Environmental Conservation, sent a 
letter to the Lobsterman’s Association informing it that the provision 
preventing non-New York residents from lobstering in the designated 
areas would no longer be enforced.22  In February 1998, Donald W. 
Brewer, Director of DEC’s Division of Law Enforcement, sent letters 
stating that he would enforce the law.23  In response, the State of 
Connecticut brought suit against Brewer.24 
iii. Majority opinion 
On appeal, the Second Circuit undertook the determination of 
whether the dispute fell within the Supreme Court’s original and 
exclusive jurisdiction under § 1251(a).25  The majority began the 
analysis by articulating that the Supreme Court has “broadly intimated 
that a plaintiff-State may generally choose whether or not to name 
 
 19  Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotations omitted).   
 20  Id.  
 21  Id.   
 22  Id.   
 23  Id.   
 24  Id.   
 25  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 96. 
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another state as a defendant in litigation challenging some action or 
statute of another State,”26 relying on the Supreme Court cases of 
Missouri v. Illinois27 and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee28  According to the 
majority, as a result of this freedom, Connecticut, by choosing only to 
sue New York officers and not the state, could proceed in district court 
provided that the state was not the “real party at interest”—i.e., that 
looking beyond the named party, the state was not in actuality the party 
whose interests would be determined by the suit.29 
To determine whether the state was the “real party at interest,” 
the majority employed a two-prong test: (1) whether actions 
specifically authorized by state law caused the alleged injury and (2) 
whether the suit implicated the state’s core sovereign interests.30  In 
regard to the first prong, the majority drew a distinction between 
actions properly carried out and specifically authorized by state law, 
and alleged injuries caused by arbitrary or improper administration of 
valid state laws; the latter do not amount to state action.31  The majority 
found that the actions were properly carried out and specifically 
authorized by state law, and therefore, this first prong was satisfied.32 
The majority then undertook analysis of the second prong, 
whether the suit implicated the State’s core sovereign interests.  In 
defining “core sovereign interests,” the majority relied on Supreme 
Court pronouncements of the manner in which the Court exercises its 
discretionary authority in choosing to exercise original jurisdiction in 
suits between the States33; the Court mainly considers the “seriousness 
[sic] and dignity of the claim”34 and implications of serious or 
important concerns of federalism.35  The majority then coupled these 
factors with the rationale that exercising the Court’s original 
 
 26  Id. at 98.   
 27  In Missouri v. Illinois, Missouri named Illinois as a defendant in order to invoke 
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to enjoin the dumping of raw sewage by the 
City of Chicago into the Mississippi River.  180 U.S. 208 (1901).  The Court rejected 
Illinois’s argument that it was not a proper defendant and accepted jurisdiction over 
the case.  Id. at 242.   
 28  In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Illinois brought suit against Milwaukee to enjoin 
the dumping of sewage into Lake Michigan.  406 U.S. 91, 97–98 (1972).  The Court 
held that its original and exclusive jurisdiction was not invoked because cities were not 
instrumentalities of the State, but rather, independent entities.  Id.  Further, the Court 
held that, while Wisconsin could be joined as a defendant, it did not have to be.  Id.   
 29  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 99. 
 30  Id.   
 31  Id.   
 32  Id.  
 33  Id. 
 34  Id. (citing Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992)).  
 35  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 99 (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 451 (1992)). 
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jurisdiction is strongest when sovereign interests are at issue.36  While 
recognizing that the Supreme Court’s pronouncements did not 
control the question of whether a case fell within the “exclusive” 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but rather only established the 
manner in which the Court might exercise its discretion over cases 
before it, the majority concluded that the cited decisions “plainly teach 
that the rationale for the Court’s original jurisdiction is strongest 
where core sovereign interests are at stake.”37  On the basis of this 
reasoning, the majority held that Connecticut’s suit did not implicate 
a core sovereign interest and therefore did not fall within the Supreme 
Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.38 
The majority then responded to the appellees’ argument that a 
state suit against a state’s officers should be considered a suit against 
the state, because suits by a state do not encounter the Eleventh 
Amendment obstacle that Ex parte Young seeks to circumvent by 
permitting citizens to sue state officers for injunctive and declaratory 
relief.39  In other words, a state suit against a state’s officers should be 
considered a suit against the state because there is an available forum, 
whereas without the narrow exception of Ex parte Young, a citizen 
would have no forum against unconstitutional acts of a state officer.  In 
disposing of the argument, the majority found that while Ex parte Young 
was not directly applicable, it should be considered broadly to reflect 
the notion that a state is only the real party at interest when damages 
are sought because a financial judgment against a state requires 
depletion of the state treasury, which is a crucial element of 
sovereignty.40 
As a matter of policy, the majority found such an interpretation 
to be advantageous, because otherwise, a state might sue another state 
and attempt to invoke the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
only to have the Court decline to exercise its jurisdiction,41 while a 
federal district court would be obligated to hear the case if subject 
matter jurisdiction exists.42  Thus, the majority found that, because the 
Supreme Court, in exercising its discretionary, original jurisdiction, 
 
 36  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 100 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 766 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).   
 37  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 100 (citing Maryland, 451 U.S. at 766 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting)).   
 38  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 103.   
 39  Id.   
 40  Id. at 101.   
 41  Id. at 102.  
 42  Id.  
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considered the “availability of an alternative forum,”43 it stood to reason 
that § 1251(a) essentially requires a plaintiff-State to invoke the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction only in cases where the Court is 
most likely to exercise its jurisdiction.44 
iv. Judge Sotomayor’s Dissent 
Circuit Judge Sotomayor dissented from the majority decision on 
the grounds that the majority contravened the plain meaning of § 
1251(a) in order to create a more efficient mode for the resolution of 
suits between states.45  Judge Sotomayor began her analysis with the 
plain language of § 1251(a).46  In Judge Sotomayor’s view, the plain 
language and legislative history, coupled with the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Mississippi v. Louisiana, made clear the Supreme Court’s 
“exclusive” jurisdiction over “all” cases between states.47  Furthermore, 
Congress could have required exclusive jurisdiction for “any” 
controversy in which a state is a party, as in § 1251(b)(2), but did not.48  
Thus, for Judge Sotomayor, the case simply became an issue of whether 
New York was the true defendant; if so, the Supreme Court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction would be invoked.49 
Judge Sotomayor would have found the action to be a controversy 
between two states.50  Finding the mere fact that New York was not 
named as a defendant not compelling, Judge Sotomayor pointed out 
that courts are directed to “look past the pleadings to identify the real 
parties in interest.”51  To determine the “real party in interest,” Judge 
Sotomayor articulated the general rule that relief sought against an 
officer is, in fact, against the sovereign if “the effect of the judgment 
would be to restrain the Government from acting, or compel it to act.”52  
An exception to the general rule exists only in cases where a state sues 
 
 43  Id. (citing Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992)). 
 44  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 102 (citing Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 77). 
 45  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 105 (Sotomayor, C.J., dissenting).   
 46  Id. 
 47  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 105 (citing Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 77–78) (“The 
uncompromising language of 28 U.S.C. §1251(a) . . . gives to this Court ‘original and 
exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States.’ Though 
phrased in terms of a grant of jurisdiction to this Court, the description of our 
jurisdiction as ‘exclusive’ necessarily denies jurisdiction of such cases to any other 
federal court.  This follows from the plain meaning of ‘exclusive’. . . .”).   
 48  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 105 
 49  Id.   
 50  Id. (Sotomayor, C.J., dissenting). 
 51  Id. at 106 (citing Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U.S. 368, 371 (1953)).   
 52  Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984); 
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)).  
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an official of another state for actions in “abuse or excess of his 
powers.”53  Having found that the officers named in the dispute were 
clearly operating within the scope of their official capacities, Judge 
Sotomayor would have held New York the real party at interest and 
therefore would have affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction.54 
Additionally, Judge Sotomayor took issue with the majority’s 
approach because of its circumvention of the plain language of § 
1251(a) and case precedent.55  While Judge Sotomayor recognized that 
a plaintiff-state has the discretion to name defendants in preparing its 
complaint, plaintiffs are “still constrained by the requirement that 
courts look beyond the form of the pleadings.”56 
Further, the “core sovereign interests” requirement, in Judge 
Sotomayor’s opinion, contravened the language of § 1251(a), its 
legislative history, and the case law interpreting the statute in a number 
of ways.57  First, the restriction substituted a lower court’s judgment for 
the Supreme Court’s determination of which case the Court will 
choose to exercise its discretion.58  In fact, the Supreme Court’s rules 
“require a complaining state petition the Supreme Court . . . [and the 
Supreme Court] has ‘substantial discretion to make case-by-case 
judgments as to the practical necessity of an original forum in the 
Court.’”59  Second, the Supreme Court has never retreated from the 
position that § 1251(a) provides the Supreme Court with the discretion 
to make case-by-case judgments.60  While permitting a lower court to 
make such a determination might improve efficiency, in Judge 
Sotomayor’s opinion, there is no legal basis for inventing such a 
device.61  Further, allocating such authority to lower courts could result 
in evaluations of the importance of cases that the Supreme Court may 
not make.62  In Judge Sotomayor’s opinion, the majority’s justification, 
that the Federal Circuit should provide a judicial forum for less 
important cases that the Supreme Court may decide to not exercise 
jurisdiction over, verified this observation (the obvious concern being 
that the lower court is inevitably making the value judgment of which 
 
 53  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 105 (citing Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22 (1900)).   
 54  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 105. 
 55  Id. at 107.   
 56  Id. (Sotomayor, C.J., dissenting). 
 57  Id. at 108.   
 58  Id. 
 59  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 108–09 (quoting SUP. CT. R. 17(3), 506 U.S. 73, 76 (1992)).   
 60  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 109.   
 61  Id. 
 62  Id.  
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cases are “less important”).63 
The majority’s application of Ex parte Young was similarly 
misguided, according to Judge Sotomayor.64  Judge Sotomayor 
believed that the principle justification for the application of Ex parte 
Young was completely missing because a plaintiff-State, in suing 
another state, is not barred by sovereign immunity and therefore has 
an available forum (unlike in the context of Ex parte Young where no 
forum would be available to address a constitutional wrong).65  In fact, 
the Supreme Court has stated that Ex parte Young should not be 
invoked where a forum is available to provide relief.66  Therefore, Judge 
Sotomayor would have found Ex parte Young irrelevant because 
Connecticut could have invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, and interpreting Ex parte Young otherwise would undermine the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity as representing any real limitation on 
the ability to sue a state.67 
B. Dainippon Screen Manufacturing Co. v. CFMT, Inc. 
i. Procedural history 
In Dainippon Screen Manufacturing Co. v. CFMT, Inc., the District 
Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiff-
appellant’s action for a declaratory judgment against the defendants-
appellees, which consisted of a corporation and its holding company.68  
The district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction 
over the appellee holding company, finding that the holding company 
was a necessary and indispensable party.69 
ii. Facts 
CFM Technologies Inc. (CFM) incorporated CFMT, Inc. (CFMT) 
as a holding company for its intellectual property.70  CFM assigned all 
of its patents to CFMT, which CFMT granted back to CFM with 
exclusive licensees.71  CFMT was at no time an operating company and 
 
 63  Id. at 109–10.   
 64  Id. at 110.   
 65  Id. at 111 (Sotomayor, CJ. (now S.C.J.), dissenting). 
 66  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 111(citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 
(1996)).  
 67  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 111–12.   
 68  Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 1998).   
 69  Id.   
 70  Id.   
 71  Id.   
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was wholly-owned by CFM.72  Dainippon Screen Manufacturing Co., 
Ltd. (Dainippon)—a competitor of CFM—and CFM attempted to 
negotiate a sublicense because of an infringement issue, but the 
negotiations fell through.73  As a result, Dainippon sued CFM, a suit 
which CFM moved to dismiss on the ground that CFMT was a necessary 
and indispensable party.74 
iii. Indispensability analysis under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) 
The Ninth Circuit, in analyzing the issue of indispensability, 
determined that CFMT was not an indispensable party.75  In making 
this determination, the court considered the four factors directed by 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) to “determine whether in equity and good 
conscience” the action could proceed:76 
(1) The extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s 
absence might prejudice that person or the existing 
parties; 
(2) The extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or 
avoided by: 
(A) Protective provisions in the judgment; 
(B) Shaping the relief; or 
(C) Other measures; 
(3) Whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence   
would be adequate; and 
(4) Whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if 
the action were dismissed for non-joinder.77 
In regard to the first factor, the court found that prejudice against 
an absent party is considered mitigated when the interests of that party 
are “adequately protected by those who are present.”78  With this rule 
in mind, the court found that CFMT’s interests were adequately 
protected by CFM because CFM owned CFMT (and therefore, in an 
indirect manner, owned the patent at issue), and had the obvious 
interest of maintaining CFMT’s patents.79  In regard to the second 
factor, the court found that its ability to shape relief was of little 
relevance in a declaratory judgment action because the relief was not 
 
 72  Id.   
 73  Id. at 1268.   
 74  Dainippon, 142 F.3d at 1268.  
 75  Id. at 1273.   
 76  See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).   
 77  Id. 
 78  Dainippon, 142 F.3d at 1272 (citing In re Allustiarte, 786 F.2d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 
1986)).   
 79  Dainippon, 142 F.3d at 1272. 
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dependent upon the patentee’s presence in court.80  The third factor, 
adequacy of the judgment, weighed in favor of permitting suit because 
a declaration of invalidity or non-infringement would serve 
Dainippon’s interest by guaranteeing that Dainippon was free from 
claims of patent infringement by CFMT, regardless of whether CFMT 
was present in the suit.81  The fourth factor, whether the plaintiff would 
have an adequate remedy if the case was dismissed, favors dismissal if 
another forum exists in which all parties could be joined in the suit.82  
The Ninth Circuit, however, found it “highly relevant that CFMT [was] 
merely CFM’s holding company for the patent in suit” and that there 
was no sound reason for dismissing a declaratory judgment against a 
parent company on the grounds that its wholly-owned patent holding 
subsidiary was an indispensable party.83 
C. The University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung 
der Wissenschaften e.V. 
i. Procedural history 
In Max-Planck, the University of Utah brought an action to correct 
inventorship of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,056,704 and 7,078,196 (the “Tuschl 
Patents”), naming Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der 
Wissenschaften e.V., Max-Planck-Innovation GmbH, Whitehead 
Institute for Biomedical Research, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, and Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (collectively “non-
state defendants”), and UMass as defendants.84  UMass filed a motion 
to dismiss on the ground that the dispute was between two states and 
therefore invoked the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).85  In response, UUtah filed an 
amended complaint substituting four UMass officials (“named 
officials”)86 in place of UMass.87  The named officials moved to dismiss 
arguing that the claim was barred by sovereign immunity, or 
alternatively, that UUtah had failed to join UMass as an indispensable 
 
 80  Id. at 1272–73.   
 81  Id. at 1273.   
 82  Id. (citing Aguilar v. L.A. Cty., 751 F.2d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1985)).   
 83  Dainippon, 142 F.3d at 1273.   
 84  Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften 
e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1317 (Fed Cir. 2013). 
 85  Id. at 1318.   
 86  Robert L. Caret (President), James R. Julian (Executive Vice President and 
Chief Operating Officer), David J. Gray (Senior Vice President for Administration, 
Finance, & Technology and University Treasurer), and James P. McNamara (Executive 
Director, Office of Technology Management).  
 87  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1317.   
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party.88  The district court denied the motion, concluding that the case 
did not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
because UUtah had chosen to sue state officials rather than the state 
itself, and therefore the district court “had jurisdiction over the action 
against the UMass state officials under the ‘Ex parte Young doctrine.’”89  
The district court further held that UMass was not an indispensable 
party because UMass’s interests would be “adequately represented” by 
the existing defendants, and an order directing the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to correct inventorship 
would provide adequate relief regardless of UMass’s presence in the 
suit.90 
ii. Facts 
The underlying dispute in Max-Planck arose out of independent, 
biochemistry research occurring at UUtah and UMass.91  Dr. Brenda 
Bass, a biochemistry professor at UUtah, was active in RNA 
interference (“RNAi”) research, a process by which RNA plays a role 
in gene silencing.92  Dr. Brenda Bass’s employment agreement assigned 
the rights to all inventions and discoveries resulting from her 
employment or research to UUtah, including the rights to any 
patents.93  Dr. Thomas Tuschl, a researcher employed by UMass, was 
also active in RNAi research.94  Drs. Tuschl and Bass attended 
professional conferences at which both presented papers; both 
admitted that they were familiar with each other’s work.95 
Dr. Tuschl applied for and was granted the Tuschl Patents, on 
which Dr. Bass was not a named inventor.96  Dr. Bass claimed the Tuschl 
Patents “disclosed and claimed her conception.”97  In response, UUtah 
requested that the assignees of the Tuschl Patents cooperate in 
petitioning the USPTO to add Dr. Bass as an inventor.98  The assignees 
declined the request, at which point UUtah initiated a suit in district 
court requesting a correction of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. §256.99 
 
 88  Id.  
 89  Id. at 1319.   
 90  Id.  
 91  Id. at 1318–19. 
 92  Id.  
 93  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1318.   
 94  Id.   
 95  Id.  
 96  Id. at 1318.   
 97  Id.  
 98  Id.   
 99  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1318. If in error an inventor is not named in an issued 
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iii. Majority Reasoning 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered three main issues: (1) 
whether the district court lacked jurisdiction because, under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a), the case fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court; (2) whether UMass was entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity; and (3) whether UMass was an indispensable 
party warranting dismissal of the case under Federal Rule 19(b). 
1. District court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) 
and the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court 
The court began the discussion of jurisdiction by recognizing that 
state universities, unlike their private, corporate counterparts, typically 
enjoy sovereign immunity.100  Thus, generally, a state university may 
neither be sued for infringement nor forced to defend against an 
action for a declaratory judgment of invalidity or non-infringement.101  
States, however, do not enjoy sovereign immunity from suits brought 
by other states.102  States can also sue citizens of other states without 
raising issues of sovereign immunity.103  Thus, the court focused its 
analysis on whether the dispute at issue fell under § 1251(a) and was 
therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,104 or 
under § 1251(b)(3) and was therefore outside the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.105 
In interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a), the majority relied on Illinois 
v. City of Milwaukee for the proposition that the Supreme Court’s 
exclusive jurisdiction is “obligatory only in appropriate cases.”106  
According to the court, “appropriateness” is determined by analysis of 
four factors: (1) the “seriousness and dignity of the claim”; (2) whether 
the “named parties” have another forum “where appropriate relief may 
be had”; (3) whether the case raises “serious and important” federalism 
 
patent, “the Director may on application of all the parties and assignees. . .issue a 
certificate correcting such error.”  35 U.S.C. § 256(a) (2011).  “The court before which 
such matter is called in question may order correction of the patent on notice and 
hearing of all parties concerned and the Director shall issue a certificate accordingly.”  
Id. § 256(b).   
 100  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1319.   
 101  Id.  See also A123 Sys. Inc. v. Hydro–Que., 626 F.3d 1213, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 102  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1319.  See also Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130 
(1984).   
 103  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1319–20.   
 104  Id. at 1320.   
 105  Id. at 1321–22.   
 106  Id. at 1320 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., 406 U.S. 91, 93–94 (1972)).   
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concerns; and (4) whether the named party is the “real party at 
interest.”107  Whether a state is the “real and substantial party in 
interest” is determined by whether it is a “mandatory” or 
“indispensable” party, such that the decree would “operate directly 
against it and adequate relief cannot be granted without it.”108  A decree 
is said to operate “directly against” a state if the judgment would 
expend itself on the state’s treasury, or if an injunction compelling 
state administration is sought.109 
Applying the statutory framework, the court reasoned that 
UUtah’s claim fell outside of the Supreme Court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction pursuant to § 1251(b)(3) because UUtah was an arm of 
the state suing officers of UMass, who are all citizens of the foreign 
state.  As such, the Supreme Court could not have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the dispute unless the state was the “real party at 
issue,” according to § 1251(a).110 
To determine if the state was the real party at issue, the court 
employed three tests: (1) the majority test in Cahill; (2) the dissent test 
in Cahill; and (3) the “mandatory” and “indispensable” test.  Under the 
Cahill majority test, a state is a real party at interest in a suit against 
officers when: (1) the alleged injury is caused by actions specifically 
authorized by state law and (2) the suit implicates a state’s core 
sovereign interests.111  Applying the Cahill majority test, the court 
assumed that the first prong of the analysis was satisfied and then 
shifted its focus to the “core sovereign interest” component.112  The 
court then held that inventorship rights are not a core sovereign 
interest because: (1) the act of inventing is a mental exercise and, as a 
result, a state cannot be an inventor; (2) inventorship is distinct from 
ownership; and (3) even if inventorship is inseparable from ownership, 
federalism concerns are not implicated.113  Thus, under this analysis, 
the state was not the “real party at issue” and, therefore, failed to invoke 




 107  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1320 (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 451 
(1992)).   
 108  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1320–21 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 (1984)).   
 109  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1320–21. 
 110  Id. at 1321–22. 
 111  Id. at 1322.   
 112  Id. at 1323.   
 113  Id.   
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Under the Cahill dissent test, the court endeavors to determine 
the real party of interest by analyzing whether the “effect of the 
judgment would be to restrain the government from acting or compel 
it to act.”114  In applying this test, the court held that a judgment would 
order the director of the USPTO to correct inventorship and therefore 
would not require or restrain UMass from acting.115  Thus, under this 
analysis, the state was not the “real party at issue” and, therefore, could 
not invoke the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction. 
Finally, under the “mandatory” and “indispensable” test, the court 
held that UMass was not indispensable on the ground that the court 
could grant relief without naming UMass as a party, because the 
director of the USPTO would be able to correct inventorship rights 
without UMass.116  While the court recognized that the judgment would 
“affect” UMass, the court found that granting relief did not amount to 
a “decree operating directly against” UMass.117  Thus, the court held 
that the state did not amount to the real party of interest in the action, 
and therefore, failed to invoke the Supreme Court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.118 
2. Eleventh Amendment immunity 
The Eleventh Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that: “The 
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State.”119  In interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, the 
Court concluded that sovereign immunity “applies only to suits by 
citizens against a State,”120 and therefore, the Eleventh Amendment is 





 114  Id. at 1324 (citing Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 
2000)).   
 115  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1324. 
 116  Id.   
 117  Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 
(1984)).   
 118  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1325.   
 119  U.S. CONST. amend. XI.   
 120  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130 
(1984)). 
 121  Id.   
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3. Indispensability and dismissal under Fed R. Civ. Pro. 
19(b) for failure to join an indispensable party 
In making its determination on the dispensability of UMass, the 
court first rejected the notion of a per se rule holding patent owners 
indispensable, and then moved on to an analysis of the four 
appropriateness factors.122  In regard to the first factor, the majority 
relied upon Dainippon—a case that permitted suit despite the fact that 
no patent owners were joined—for the conclusion that the other 
owners who were a party to the suit would adequately represent 
UMass’s interests.123  As to the second factor, the court found that the 
ability to shape relief to minimize prejudice had little relevance 
because the finding on the first factor tended to suggest that there 
would be minimal prejudice.124  Regarding the third factor, the court 
found that an order directing the USPTO to correct inventorship 
would be sufficient in the absence of UMass, with UUtah receiving all 
of the relief requested.125  In regard to the fourth factor, the court 
concluded that the availability of another forum was not particularly 
strong, recognizing that the Supreme Court only rarely accepts such 
cases.126  Thus, the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that UMass 
was not an indispensable party to the suit.127 
iv. Dissent 
Circuit Judge Moore dissented from the majority decision on the 
grounds that the majority erroneously held that the controversy was 
not between two or more states, and further erred by holding that a 
patent owner is not indispensable in an action seeking to reassign 
title.128 
1. District court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) 
and the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court 
In the opinion of Circuit Judge Moore, the district court lacked 
jurisdiction over UUtah’s claims against UMass officials.129  While Judge 
 
 122  Id. at 1326.  See also supra text accompanying note 107.   
 123  Id. at 1327 (citing Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266, 
1272 (9th Cir. 1998).   
 124  Id. at 1327–28.   
 125  Id. at 1328.   
 126  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1328–29.   
 127  Id. at 1328.   
 128  Id. at 1328 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).   
 129  Id.  
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Moore agreed with the proposition that the Court must look to the 
“real party in interest,” she took issue with the majority’s analysis in 
making the determination.130 
As an initial matter, Judge Moore would have framed the action 
as an issue of ownership, rather than simply inventorship.131  In support 
of this proposition, Judge Moore cited the complaint where UUtah 
alleged that it “should be the sole owner or owner”132 and requested an 
“order assignment of all right title and interest” of the Tuschl 
patents.133  Further, Judge Moore highlighted that, under 35 U.S.C. 
§256(b), parties with an “economic stake” in the patent are proper 
defendants who may be subject to a correction of inventorship.134  Yet, 
according to Judge Moore, the majority provided no support for the 
contention that the UMass officials named in UMass’s stead were 
“parties concerned.”135 
Interpreting the statute, Judge Moore found that the “core 
sovereign interests” test employed by the majority was at odds with the 
plain language of § 1251(a), which contains “uncompromising 
language” of the Supreme Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction 
over “all controversies between two or more States.”136  In Judge 
Moore’s view, the majority’s misreading of the statute’s plain meaning 
led to the interpretation that a core sovereign interest was required to 
implicate the Supreme Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction; the 
majority thereby deprived the Supreme Court of the opportunity to 
exercise its discretion.137  While the Supreme Court possesses exclusive 
and original jurisdiction over all cases between two or more states, it is 
not required to exercise its jurisdiction over every controversy.138  The 
concept of “core sovereign interests” arises from opinions in which the 
Supreme Court articulates its decision to exercise the Court’s 
jurisdiction over a particular dispute, not whether the dispute falls 
solely within its original jurisdiction.139  By jumbling these two, separate 
concepts, Judge Moore found that the majority eliminated the 
 
 130  Id. at 1329.   
 131  Id. at 1329–30.   
 132  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1329 (citing J.A. 134).  
 133  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1329 (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (citing J.A. 142).   
 134  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1329 (citing Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1359–
60 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).   
 135  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1329. 
 136  Id. (citing Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992)).   
 137  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1329. 
 138  Id.   
 139  Id. (citing Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 76–77); see also Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 
554, 570 (1983).   
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Supreme Court’s discretion and reallocated this power to the lower 
courts to decide which cases will be presented to the Supreme Court.140 
Judge Moore also took issue with the majority’s reliance on the 
Second Circuit’s split decision in Cahill.141  Further, even applying the 
reasoning in Cahill, Judge Moore would have found that the dispute 
fell solely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for 
two reasons.142  First, a judgment in favor of UUtah would have 
restrained UMass’s ability to act in that UMass would no longer be able 
to license or assign the Tuschl patents, and UUtah would be able to 
exclude UMass from practicing the inventions claimed in its patents.143  
Patent rights are the “quintessential right to restrain,” and therefore, 
an adverse judgment preventing UMass from exploiting the Tuschl 
patents would undoubtedly have the “effect of . . . restrain[ing] the 
Government from acting.”144  Even as a co-inventor, UUtah could have 
practiced and licensed the patents without UMass’s consent and 
without having to account to UMass, restraining UMass from asserting 
its rights to the Tuschl patents against UUtah or any UUtah licensees.145  
Second, Judge Moore took issue with the majority’s proposition that 
UMass would only be “more or less affected” and that transfer of the 
Tuschl patents to UUtah would “not deplete the state treasury.”146  
Rather, Judge Moore saw the central effect of a judgment against 
UMass as depleting the assets of the current owners, one of whom was 
the State of Massachusetts.147 
Thus, Judge Moore would have found that UMass was a real party 
in interest in the case, and therefore, the dispute, in the opinion of the 
learned judge, should have fallen squarely within the original and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.148 
2. Indispensability and dismissal under Fed R. Civ. Pro. 
19(b) for failure to join an indispensable party 
Circuit Judge Moore would have also found UMass an 
indispensable party to the suit.149  The Federal Circuit has held that 
when a plaintiff brings “a declaratory judgment seeking to invalidate a 
 
 140  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1330 (Moore, C.J., dissenting). 
 141  Id.   
 142  Id.   
 143  Id.   
 144  Id. (citing Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2000)).   
 145  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1331 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).   
 146  Id.  
 147  Id.   
 148  Id.   
 149  Id. at 1331.   
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patent or hold it not infringed the patentee is both a necessary and 
indispensable” party. 150  Thus, in Judge Moore’s opinion, it would be 
illogical to require all patent owners to be joined in suit to invalidate a 
patent, but not in a suit over patent ownership.151  Further, the 
majority’s reliance on Dainippon for an exception to the rule that all 
patent owners be joined relied on an omission of key facts.152  Perhaps 
most significantly, in Dainippon, the absent party to the suit was a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the named party and therefore had 
identical interests.153  While Judge Moore recognized that other 
defendants also have an interest in the patents, she was quick to point 
out that they do not necessarily represent UMass’s interest, and that 
the interests among the parties might very well diverge.154 
IV.  MISAPPLICATION OF LAW IN MAX–PLANCK AND A DECISION 
INCORRECTLY DECIDED ON BOTH SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND 
JOINDER GROUNDS 
Max-Planck is incorrectly decided because the court contravenes 
the plain language of § 1251(a), misapplies Supreme Court case law, 
and relies almost entirely on Cahill’s flawed reasoning.  The decision 
places the doctrine of sovereign immunity in limbo, as it gives the 
appearance of applying in a situation for which it was never intended.  
Furthermore, as a result of the Federal Circuit’s enthusiasm to hear 
the case, the court misapplies the factors of Rule 19(b). 
 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
i. The conflated majority framework 
The majority begins its analysis by framing this case as a dispute 
over whether the State is suing another state invoking § 1251(a), or the 
State is suing the citizen of another state invoking § 1251(b)(3).155  As 
a result of the court’s desire to squeeze this dispute under § 
1251(b)(3), the Federal Circuit seeks to impose limiting criteria upon 
 
 150  Id. (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (citing A123 Sys. Inc. v. Hydro-Que., 626 F.3d 1213, 
1217–22 (Fed Cir. 2010); Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1094 
(Fed Cir. 1998)).   
 151  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1331 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).   
 152  Id. at 1332.   
 153  Id. (citing Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266, 1272–73 
(9th Cir. 1998); A123 Sys. Inc., 626 F.3d at 1221).   
 154  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1332.   
 155  See supra notes 104–105 and accompanying text.  
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§ 1251(a).156 
Looking first to the plain reading of the statute, it is obvious from 
the “uncompromising language” of § 1251(a) granting “original and 
exclusive” jurisdiction over “all” controversies between states that there 
is little room for the majority to glean any limiting requirements from 
the statute itself.157  Further, to impose any limiting requirement, the 
court must in fact ignore the plain and unambiguous Supreme Court 
interpretation of the word “exclusive” as necessarily denying 
jurisdiction to other federal courts.158  As Judge (now Justice) 
Sotomayor astutely articulated, Congress could have granted 
“original,” but not “exclusive,” jurisdiction over controversies between 
states as in § 1251(b)(2), but chose otherwise.159 
Without any basis for limiting § 1251(a) based on its plain 
language, the Federal Circuit was forced to take a creative approach to 
Supreme Court precedent.  The court did so by latching on to the 
language that § 1251(a) is “obligatory only in appropriate cases.”160  
From this snippet of Supreme Court language, the majority found an 
opening to impose a statutory limiting analysis, by reasoning that such 
language requires the court to determine whether or not a case is 
“appropriate.”161 
Grafting language from Supreme Court cases analyzing proper 
application of the Court’s own discretion, the court identified four 
factors to determine “appropriateness”: (1) the serious and dignity of 
the claim; (2) the availability of an alternative forum; (3) serious and 
important federalism concerns; and (4) the real party in interest.162  
The court then focused in on the fourth factor, that the court look to 
the “real parties at interest,” to align its interpretation with the 
reasoning of Cahill (which centered on the issue of whether New York 
was the real party at interest).163  Relying on the language of 
Cunningham and Illinois, the court reasoned that the real party at 
interest is determined by whether it is “mandatory” or 
 
 156  See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the imposition of a “core 
sovereign interests” requirement).  
 157  Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77–78 (1992).   
 158  Id.   
 159  See supra note 48 and accompanying text.   
 160  See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  See also Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 75.   
 161  See supra note 106 and accompanying text.   
 162  See supra note 107 and accompanying text.   
 163  See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
DECOTIIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:43 AM 
700 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:679 
“indispensable”164 such that a decree would operate directly against it.165  
The court then applied the majority reasoning of Cahill in an attempt 
to cram two of the remaining three factors: (1) the “seriousness and 
dignity of the claim;” and (2) the implication of federalism concerns, 
under the newly formed umbrella of “real party at interest.”166  Only 
after creating this amalgamation of assorted case law does the court 
seek to inoculate this case with its cocktail of analytical tests. 
Before analyzing the court’s tests, it is important to note a number 
of failings in the Federal Circuit’s framing of the analysis.  As an initial 
matter, the court’s analysis stands as an obvious contravention of 
proper statutory interpretation.  In the context of jurisdictional 
statutes, courts are to begin “with the text of the provision in question, 
and move on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in 
which it occurs.”167  In Max-Planck, however, the court completely 
looked past the plain meaning of the word “exclusive,” which expressly 
grants jurisdiction in one court and divests it in others, without 
providing any grounds for doing so.168  The court further failed to 
consider the statutory language in the context of its overall structure 
as well.  As Judge Sotomayor correctly noted, Congress could have 
altered the language to provide for non-exclusive jurisdiction as it did 
in the provisions immediately following § 1251(a).169  In fact, the 
Federal Circuit has flipped proper statutory analysis on its head by first 
relying on non-binding case law and Supreme Court cases that are not 
directly applicable, without any discussion of the legislative history or 
the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language.170 
Furthermore, it is notable that when one analyzes the case law 
from which the language “obligatory only in appropriate cases” is 
taken, the phrase is used in a completely separate context.171  In 
Mississippi v. Louisiana, the Court found its original jurisdiction to be 
 
 164  See Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften 
e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick 
R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 457 (1883); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97 (1972).   
 165  Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 
(1984)).   
 166  See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.   
 167  See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645, 655 (1995); see also BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 128 
(1983) (“The starting point, as always, is the language of the statute.”).   
 168  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. See also Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 
U.S. 73, 77–78 (1992). 
 169  See supra note 49 and accompanying text.   
 170  See supra notes 106–108 and accompanying text.   
 171  See supra note 106 and accompanying text; see also Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 75; 
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93–94 (1972).   
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“obligatory only in appropriate cases,” to the extent that the Supreme 
Court was permitted to exercise discretion over whether or not the 
Court would choose to hear a particular case.172  At no point in 
Mississippi is there any dispute as to whether the grant of “exclusive” 
jurisdiction vests authority to hear a controversy between states solely 
in the Supreme Court.173  Yet, disregarding the express language of 
Mississippi, which states that exclusive jurisdiction necessarily divests 
jurisdiction in all other courts,174 the majority in Max-Planck 
manipulates the Supreme Court’s language to reach the contrary 
conclusion.175 
It is notable that the majority in Max-Planck sought to frame the 
analysis in such a way, considering that the court in Cahill took a more 
direct approach by simply stating that a plaintiff-State has free reign to 
choose defendants, and the court need only determine who is a “real 
party at interest.”176  The manner in which the Max-Planck majority 
attempts to weave “appropriateness” factors into an analysis of the “real 
party at interest” suggests that the court recognized the shaky doctrinal 
ground upon which the majority test in Cahill was founded and sought 
to fortify its position.  In so doing, however, the court merely muddled 
together two, distinct principles which were never meant to be 
intertwined—the determination of a real party at interest and the 
Supreme Court’s determination of whether or not to exercise 
discretionary authority. 
 
ii. Failings of the Three Tests Used to Determine a Real 
Party at Interest 
Having grafted a test of “appropriateness” onto § 1251(a), the 
court reasoned that because UMass officers are citizens of a foreign 
state, § 1251(b)(3) applies unless the state is the “real party at interest,” 
thus invoking § 1251(a).177  The court, however, faced the obvious 
 
 172  See Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 77 (“We first exercised this discretion not to accept 
original actions in cases within our nonexclusive original jurisdiction . . . But we have 
since carried over its exercise to actions . . . where our jurisdiction is exclusive.”). 
 173  See id. at 78 (“[T]he description of our jurisdiction as ‘exclusive’ necessarily 
denies jurisdiction of such cases to any other federal court. This follows from the plain 
meaning of ‘exclusive,’ see WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 890 (2d ed. 
1942) (‘debar from possession’)”); see also, e.g., California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 63 
(1979). 
 174  Id.   
 175  See supra note 106 and accompanying text.   
 176  See supra note 29 and accompanying text.   
 177  See supra note 110 and accompanying text.   
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difficulty of deciding which test is correct to impose in making this 
determination.  Rather than make a determination, the court chose to 
employ three, seemingly relevant analyses. 
a. Failings of the Cahill majority test 
The first test the majority employed in Max-Planck is based entirely 
on the majority opinion in Cahill.  Under the Cahill majority analysis, a 
state is a real party at interest in a suit against officers if: (1) the alleged 
injury is authorized by state law, and (2) the suit implicates a state’s 
core sovereign interests.178  The first prong in the analysis is derived 
from Louisiana v. Texas, a suit against an official who allegedly acted 
beyond the scope of his office, i.e., in “abuse or excess of powers,” 
where the Supreme Court determined that such action is not a 
controversy between states.179  The second prong, however, is derived 
from more tenuous reasoning.  In support of the “core sovereign 
interests” factor, the court first looked to remarks the Supreme Court 
had made, pronouncing the manner in which the Court chooses to 
exercise discretionary authority.180  From these pronouncements, the 
majority hijacked two factors: (1) “the serious[ness] and dignity of the 
claim”181 and (2) the “serious[ness] and important concerns of 
federalism.”182  Recognizing that these two factors are not directly 
applicable to the case at hand, the majority sought to justify grafting 
this analysis onto a new context by relying on Justice Rehnquist’s 
dissent in Maryland v. Louisiana; in his dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated 
that he “would require that the State’s claim involve some tangible 
relation to a state’s sovereign interest” before choosing to exercise the 
Court’s jurisdiction.183  Adopting Justice Rehnquist’s position is 
untenable for a number of reasons.  First, as a dissent, Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion is not controlling law.  Second, and perhaps most 
importantly, the fundamental reason for Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is 
that the statutory construction and controlling opinion do not limit 
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in any way.184  In fact, Justice 
 
 178  See supra note 111 and accompanying text.   
 179  Louisiana v. Texas 176 U.S. 1, 22 (1900); see also Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. 
Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, C.J., dissenting).   
 180  See supra note 33 and accompanying text.   
 181  See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 182  See supra note 35 and accompanying text.   
 183  See supra note 36 and accompanying text.   
 184  Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 770 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“The basic problem with the Court’s opinion, in my view, is that it articulates no 
limiting principles that would prevent this Court from being deluged by original 
actions brought by original actions brought by States . . .”). 
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Rehnquist recognized and expressly articulated that the “problem is 
accentuated . . . because it falls within our original and exclusive 
jurisdiction, which means that similar cases not only can be but must 
be brought here.”185 
The majority in Cahill even seems to recognize the unconvincing 
nature of the reasoning by which it concocted the “core sovereign 
interests” test, stating that “these cases do not control the question we 
face here”; yet, the majority continues with its reasoning, unfazed by a 
lack of controlling authority, on the ground that the opinions “plainly 
teach that the rationale for the Court’s original jurisdiction is strongest 
where core sovereign interests are at stake.”186 
b. The correct, but misapplied, Cahill dissent test 
The second test the majority employed in Max-Planck was based 
on Judge Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion in Cahill.  Unlike the majority 
analysis, Judge Sotomayor’s test was founded upon stable, controlling 
Supreme Court doctrine and, of the three tests utilized, provided the 
proper statutory interpretation.  Under the Cahill dissent analysis, a 
dispute between the states falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court under § 1251(a).187  The only issue left to resolve is 
whether the state is the real party at interest.188  A state is a real party at 
interest in a suit against officers if “the effect of the judgment would 
be to restrain the government from acting or compel it to act.”189  This 
analysis was derived primarily from Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, where the Court drew on cases involving suits against state 
officials barred by the Eleventh Amendment as being against the State 
itself.190  In Pennhurst, the Court articulated the general rule “that relief 
sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if 
the decree would operate against the latter.”191  Further delineating the 
general rule, a decree is considered to operate against the State if “the 
judgment sought would expend itself on the pubic treasury . . . or 
interfere with the public administration”192 or the effect of the 
judgment would be to “restrain the government from acting or compel 
 
 185  Id. at 770–771. 
 186  Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2000).   
 187  See supra note 47 and accompanying text.   
 188  See supra note 49 and accompanying text.   
 189  See supra note 114 and accompanying text.   
 190  See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984); see also 
Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).   
 191  Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101.   
 192  Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947). 
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it to act.”193  This rather bright-lined rule is excepted only by actions in 
“abuse or excess of power.”194 
The only failing of Judge Sotomayor’s analysis in the context of 
Max-Planck is that it is inexplicably placed under an arbitrary umbrella 
of “appropriateness.”  Notably, in Cahill, however, Judge Sotomayor’s 
analysis occurs in the context of determining the “real party at 
interest.”195  It is not a component of a larger, overall framework for 
determining “appropriateness,” but rather is illogically superimposed 
by the majority. 
c. Failings of the “mandatory” and “indispensable” test 
The third test the majority employed in Max-Planck, considered 
the “broad view” of Supreme Court cases, is really a restatement of 
Judge Sotomayor’s dissent, but in terms so broad as to deprive the 
Court’s opinion of any real analysis.  Unwittingly articulated as a 
separate analysis due to the conflated framework the majority in Max-
Planck developed, the court attempted to stuff the entirety of Judge 
Sotomayor’s analysis under the language “indispensable” or 
“mandatory,” such that it could be quickly dismissed. 
For the language “mandatory” and “indispensable,” the majority 
in Max-Planck relied on two cases that stood in direct opposition to the 
conclusion the majority sought to reach.  In Cunningham, the Court 
held that the plaintiffs could not bring suit against the governor, who 
had no personal interest in the matter, in “an attempt to make the state 
of Georgia a party to the suit through the defendant as governor, so as 
to bind the state by the judgment and decision of the court in case.”196  
Georgia, as an indispensable party, needed to be joined to the suit in 
order to receive the relief the plaintiff was seeking against Georgia.197  
In Illinois, the Court held that its original and exclusive jurisdiction was 
not invoked because only a city, which is not an instrumentality of the 
State, was named as a defendant, and while the State could be joined 
as a permissible party, it was not mandatory it be made one.198  Of these 
two cases, Illinois is completely irrelevant to the analysis considering 
 
 193  Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949); see also Dugan v. 
Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 502 (1921).   
 194  See supra note 177 and accompanying text.   
 195  See supra note 51 and accompanying text.   
 196  Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 449 (1883).   
 197  Id. at 451 (“The principle is conceded in all the cases, and whenever it can be 
clearly seen that the state is an indispensable party . . . to grant relief sought, it [lower 
courts] will refuse to take jurisdiction.”). 
 198  Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97–98; see also supra note 28 and 
accompanying text.   
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that the defendant, namely, the city, was a completely separate entity 
from the State; there was no need to determine the “real party at 
interest.”  Cunningham is more compelling, considering it is essentially 
concerned with determining the “real party at interest,” however, it 
does not necessarily stand for the proposition that a state must be 
shown to be “indispensable” in order to be held a “real party at 
interest.”  Rather, it merely remarks that if relief cannot be granted 
without a state present, the state is indispensable, and suing a state 
official operating in his or her official capacity cannot act as a stand-in 
to bind a state.199 
Accepting the label of “indispensable” despite its contextual 
misplacement (and perhaps future risk of conflation with Rule 19(b)) 
led the majority to the issue of relief, mainly an analysis of whether an 
adverse judgment would affect state action.  While Judge Sotomayor’s 
analysis is situated on firmer analytical ground, the “wider analysis” 
essentially arrives at the same test derived from Pennhurst.  The majority 
erred in its application of this third test only to the extent that it did 
not devote proper effort to the inquiry, disposing of Pennhurst in a 
string citation.200  It further erred to the degree that the “wider view” 
test is repetitive. 
iii. UMass should be the real party at interest regardless of 
the test applied 
Beyond the errors in the majority’s reasoning, even if tests are 
applied as presented by the majority opinion, UMass should be the 
“real party at interest.” 
a. Application of the Cahill majority test 
The majority accepted as a given that the actions of UMass 
officials causing the alleged injury were authorized by state law.201  
Moving then to the second prong, the court held that inventorship 
rights are not a core sovereign interest because: (1) the act of inventing 
is a mental exercise; (2) inventorship is distinct from ownership; and 
(3) federalism concerns are not implicated.202 
The majority’s first reason fails on its own terms.  The State, as a 
sovereign, operates entirely through the mental processes or physical 
actions of state employees who act on behalf of the State.  In fact, the 
 
 199  See infra note 251 and accompanying text.   
 200  See Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften 
e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1324 (Fed Cir. 2013).   
 201  See id. at 1323.   
 202  See supra note 113 and accompanying text.   
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concept of sovereign immunity is based around this principle, as it 
permits state actors to operate within the scope of their duties without 
fear of suit—i.e., “to protect the government from claims arising out 
of its lawful activity.”203  To hold otherwise would be to undermine a 
fundamental principle of sovereign immunity; taken to its extreme, it 
suggests that each law the state legislature passes is directly attributable 
to the mental capacities of the representative who drafted the law 
rather than the legislative body as a whole.  As a policy matter, such a 
situation is obviously untenable. 
Accepting the majority’s assertion that inventing is a mental act 
that affects only natural persons, and therefore, that “inventors cannot 
be corporations or sovereigns,” there is no reason any of the non-state, 
institutional defendants or the officers of UMass should be joined to 
the suit as defendants.204  As a matter of logic, if “inventorship” 
concerns only individuals, then only individuals named as “inventors” 
should be parties to the suit (namely Dr. Tuschl), because relief may 
only come from “inventors.”  This argument obviously defies logic.  
Even the majority recognizes, without reservation that “state 
universities frequently obtain assignments on patents invented by their 
faculties and staff, just as private corporations often obtain assignments 
on patents invented by their employees.”205 
Second, such a rigid understanding of “inventorship” results in 
similarly flawed logic in seeking to distinguish “inventorship” from 
“ownership.”  UUtah names all parties with rights to the patent because 
UUtah does not merely seek to have the inventor’s name included on 
the patent, but rather seeks ownership rights through a change in 
“inventorship” status.206  If inventorship status and ownership were 
distinct as the majority would suggest, UUtah would have no incentive 
to pursue litigation over such a trivial matter as whose name is credited 
(especially considering the cost of an appeal).  The litigation is worth 
pursuing because UUtah recognizes that “[e]ach co-inventor 
presumptively owns a pro rata[,] undivided interest in the entire 
patent, no matter what their [sic] respective contributions.”207  The 
 
 203  See Margot C. Wuebbels, Commerical Terrorism: A Commercial Activity Exception 
under §1605(a)(2) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1123, 1141 
(1993); see also Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 725 (3d Cir. 1979) (“The primary purpose 
of the 11th Amendment is to assure federal courts do not interfere with state’s public 
policy and its administration of public affairs.”).   
 204  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1323.   
 205  Id. at 1319.   
 206  Id. at 1330 (“A finding that Dr. Bass is a co-inventor of the Tuschl II patents will 
result in UUtah co-owning those patents.”).   
 207  Id. at 1323 (quoting Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1465 
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formalistic view adopted by the majority in framing the conflict solely 
in terms of “inventorship” fails because the inherent value in 
“inventorship” is the property right of an undivided interest in the 
patent.208 
Seeking to bolster its argument, the majority continued with the 
sweeping statement that even if ownership of a patent is in dispute, 
such a dispute does not “implicate serious and important concerns of 
federalism,” because patent rights are not “akin to State ownership of 
water rights, natural resources, or other property.”209  The majority, 
however, provided no analysis as to why a patent does not fall under 
state ownership of “other property.”  It seems difficult to distinguish a 
patent as the “governmental grant of a right to exclude others from 
making, using, marketing, selling, offering for sale, or importing an 
invention” from an exclusionary right a sovereign might exercise over 
a natural resource.210  In Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, the Ninth Circuit 
found that an Indian tribe, protected from suit by sovereign immunity, 
was indispensable because a reallocation of a harvest of fish from the 
Columbia River would require a reallocation of the quota (i.e., a 
percentage of ownership of the harvest) the tribe would receive.211  
While the subject matter of the cases differ, the similarities are 
uncanny.  In Max-Planck, UMass could not be joined as a party to the 
suit without invoking the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction 
because it was a sovereign.  In Makah Indian Tribe, the Indian tribes 
could not be joined to the suit because they were immune as 
sovereigns.212  In Max-Planck, the resource in question is the pro rata 
share of an invention through the exclusionary right of a patent.  In 
Makah Indian Tribe, the resource in question is the pro rata share of a 
fish harvest—i.e., the exclusionary right of a tribe to own a portion of 
the fish harvest.213  It seems illogical to hold that a pro rata distribution 
of fish would be of greater importance to the sovereign than pro rata 
ownership of a patent right.  In other words, it seems unlikely that 
Makah Indian Tribe would come out differently if the Indian tribes had 
collectively owned a pro rata interest in a patent.  Without any 
reasoning, however, it is impossible to do more than speculate as to 
why a patent interest would not qualify as “other property.” 
 
(Fed Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted)).   
 208  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1323. 
 209  Id. (citing Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2000)).   
 210  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1300 (10th ed. 2014).   
 211  Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1990).   
 212  Id.   
 213  Id.   
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b. Application of the Cahill dissent test 
The majority holds that “the effect of the judgment” would not 
“restrain the Government from acting or compel it to act”214 because a 
judgment ordering the Director of the USPTO to correct inventorship 
will neither require nor restrain UMass from acting, because the 
Director of the USPTO is the individual who will be physically 
compelled to change the inventorship status under 35 U.S.C. § 
256(a).215  Never was a more “form over substance” statement ever 
made.  While the majority is correct that §256 permits the Director, 
“with proof of the facts and such other requirements as may be 
imposed, [to] issue a certificate correcting such error [of omitting 
inventors],” the court decree compelling the Director’s action 
operates, in substance, as a restraint on UMass’s ownership rights of 
the Tuschl patents.216  Patents are by definition a “governmental grant 
of a right to exclude others.”217  By altering the ownership structure 
through the compelled action of the Director, deprivation of UMass’s 
ownership rights, either in their entirety or through adjustment of a 
pro rata share of ownership, will permit UUtah to restrain UMass from 
practicing the inventions claimed in the patents, licensing the patents, 
or assigning the patents.218 
c. Application of the “Mandatory” and “Indispensable” 
Test 
The majority finds UMass neither “indispensable” nor 
“mandatory,” because while UMass “may be ‘more or less affected by 
the decision,’ the court’s decree will not deplete the state treasury.”219  
The majority once again provides little support for this contention 
other than perhaps the fact that monetary damages are not being 
sought.220  It is notable, however, that universities earn over a billion 
dollars annually from licensing inventions.221  In fact, the court 
specifically notes the Tuschl patents as “having generated hundreds of 
 
 214  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1323.   
 215  Id.   
 216  See supra note 143 and accompanying text.   
 217  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1300 (10th ed. 2014). 
 218  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1330–31 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).   
 219  Id. at 1324 (majority opinion) (citing Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. 
Co., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883)).   
 220  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1324. 
 221  Goldie Blumenstyk, Universities Report $1.8–Billion in Earnings on Inventions in 
2011, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 28, 2012), http://chronicle.com/ 
article/University–Inventions–Earned/133972.   
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millions of dollars in revenue.”222  Knowing that the Tuschl patents 
generated millions of dollars in revenue, and that a change in 
inventorship would adjust the pro rata portion of profits being 
allocated to the various owners, it is difficult to imagine how a decree 
in this instance would not significantly impact revenue to the state 
treasury, considering that the income a state university generates is 
paid to the state treasury. 
B. Sovereign Immunity 
i. Sovereign immunity’s inapplicability to the present 
dispute 
The majority in Max-Planck is quick to dispose of the sovereign 
immunity argument on the ground that sovereign immunity does not 
apply to an action in which a state is suing a citizen.223  While the 
majority is correct in this instance, it is interesting to note that the 
majority in Cahill, upon which the majority in Max-Planck relied, 
undertook an analysis to show that the spirit of Ex parte Young 
supported limiting the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.224 
The majority in Cahill misapplied Ex parte Young in a number of 
ways.  As an initial matter, the majority notes that Ex parte Young is not 
applicable to a dispute between states.225  The Ex parte Young doctrine 
is a limited exception created by the Supreme Court with the primary 
purpose of providing a forum to address a constitutional wrong where 
otherwise no forum would exist.226  In the case of disputes between 
states, Ex parte Young has no place because a state has exclusive access 
to the highest court in the land.227  Additionally, the Second Circuit’s 
broad application of the “spirit” of Ex parte Young is directly contrary to 
the Supreme Court’s continual effort to limit the doctrine.228  As the 
Supreme Court articulated in Idaho v. Coeur d’ Alene Tribe of Idaho: 
 
 
 222  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1331 n.1 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).  
 223  See supra note 121 and accompanying text.   
 224  See supra note 40 and accompanying text.   
 225  Id.  
 226  See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996); see also Idaho v. 
Coeur d’ Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 274 (1997).   
 227  Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 111 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, 
C.J., dissenting).   
 228  See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) 
(holding that Young may not be invoked to permit suits against State officials for 
violations of State law); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986) (stating that Young 
is narrowly tailored to conform to only those specific situations in which it is necessary 
to allow a federal court to vindicate federal rights).   
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To interpret Young to permit a federal court-action to 
proceed in every case where prospective, declaratory, and 
injunctive relief is sought against an officer, named in his 
individual capacity, would be to adhere to an empty 
formalism and to undermine the principle . . . that Eleventh 
Amendment immunity represents a real limitation on a 
federal court’s federal-question jurisdiction.  The real 
interest served by the Eleventh Amendment are [sic] not to 
be sacrificed to elementary mechanics of captions and 
pleading.  Application of the Young exception must reflect a 
proper understanding of its role in our federal system . . . .229 
Thus, while correctly noting that sovereign immunity does not apply 
to the dispute at hand, the majority adopts an analysis for resolving the 
dispute which relies on misapplied doctrine. 
ii. The reason a sovereign immunity argument seems to 
apply to the present dispute 
It is clear that sovereign immunity does not contemplate 
controversies between two or more states or between a state and a 
citizen.  Yet, despite the court’s rapid rejection of such argument, the 
defense of sovereign immunity is not so outlandish as to warrant its 
dismissal without analysis.  The Court’s invention of the ability of a 
state to sue a foreign state actor operating within the scope of his or 
her employment (for which a state actor would normally receive 
sovereign immunity) in place of the state puts the court in an 
uncomfortable limbo between § 1251(a) and § 1251(b)(3).  A state is 
quite clearly free to sue a citizen under § 1251(b)(3), and the State is 
also free to sue another state under § 1251(a), but the repercussions 
of a state suing a state employee working within the scope of his or her 
employment is not contemplated.  Typically, a state employee working 
within the scope of his or her employment is entitled to sovereign 
immunity.230  Thus, it would stand to reason that a state suing a state 
employee for actions taken within the scope of his or her employment 
would raise a similar sovereign immunity issue.  Logically, however, this 
is not the case because a state employee acting within the scope of his 
or her employment acts on behalf of the sovereign, and as such, a state 
can properly bring suit against the defendant-state.  Permitting a 
plaintiff-state to plead around a defendant-state by joining a state 
official destroys this logic and places the concept of sovereign 
immunity in an untenable position. 
 
 229  Coeur d’ Alene, 521 U.S. at 270. 
 230  See supra note 203 and accompanying text.   
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C. Rule 19(b) – Indispensable Party 
i. The factors weigh in favor of finding indispensability 
As a general rule, all co-owners must be joined in an action 
affecting their patent.231  The Max-Planck majority’s attempt to 
distinguish the case law requiring patent owners to be named as parties 
on the ground that the cases concern standing to bring suit rather than 
indispensability is lacking.232  It would be inequitable to suggest that all 
patent owners must be joined in a suit seeking to invalidate a patent, 
but not in a suit where their own ownership is at issue.233  This 
argument’s logical failings are further highlighted by consideration of 
§256(b)’s requirement that a court provide notice to those with an 
“economic stake” in a patent before ordering correction of 
inventorship.234 
In support of disregarding the general rule, the majority looks to 
the case of Dainippon and concludes that the facts of Max-Planck are 
stronger than Dainippon.235  The majority’s analysis in Max-Planck, 
however, is unavailing because it omits certain highly relevant facts of 
Dainippon.236  The majority concludes that UUtah’s case is stronger on 
the first factor in favor of indispensability because, in Dainippon, the 
suit was permitted to continue even though no patent owners were 
joined.237  The majority, however, omits the fact that CFMT (the 
holding company of all patents) was incorporated entirely for the 
purpose of holding CFM’s patents and operated at all times as a wholly-
owned subsidiary of CFM.238  Because the parties’ interests were 
therefore “not just common but identical,” the suit was permitted to 
go forward without the patent owner being named.239  While it is true 
that in Dainippon the defendants were jointly represented by legal 
counsel, the fact that defendants in Max-Planck were jointly 
represented by legal counsel is not dispositive; a significant difference 
 
 231  See Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1467 (Fed Cir. 1998). 
 232  Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften 
e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Alfred E. Mann Found. for 
Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).   
 233  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1331 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).   
 234  Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 235  See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 236  Id. 
 237  See supra note 123 and accompanying text.   
 238  See Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266, 1267–68 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
 239  See A123 Sys. v. Hydro-Que., 626 F.3d 1213, 1221 (Fed Cir. 2010) (discussing 
Dainippon in support of the holding that an absent patentee is indispensable when the 
named party has “overlapping” but not “identical” interests).   
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exists between legal representation of essentially one client (the 
second client being a wholly-owned subsidiary of the first client) and 
legal representation of as many as four, distinct entities whose interests 
might diverge over the course of a litigation.240  Furthermore, the mere 
fact that UMass entered into an agreement by which Alnylam (a non-
state defendant) received control over the suit is not dispositive, as the 
agreement is contingent on the absence of a conflict of interest.241 
The second factor provides little guidance, as it is based primarily 
on the first factor.242  In regard to the third factor, the majority 
compounds its mistaken argument by relying on the hollow formalism 
that directing the USPTO to correct inventorship would not be 
insufficient in the absence of UMass.243  In responding to the 
defendant’s contention that an order could not be binding on UMass, 
the majority postulates that the order would be binding on the 
USPTO, which could then change inventorship.244  This argument is 
problematic because it directly contradicts the majority’s jurisdictional 
argument that an adverse judgment would not directly operate against 
UMass.245  Following the majority’s conclusion through to its logical 
end, the majority would hold that UMass would not be directly affected 
by a change in inventorship status, yet UUtah would be able to receive 
all of the relief it requests (including a change in ownership of UMass’s 
interest, or at the least a pro rata reduction of UMass’s interest).246  In 
regard to the fourth factor, the majority determines that despite the 
clear language of § 1251(a) requiring exclusive jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court, the possibility that the Supreme Court would accept 






 240  See Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften 
e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore, C.J. dissenting).   
 241  Id. at 1328 (noting that the majority recognizes the possibility of a conflict of 
interest and UMass’s then-ability to renew its motion).   
 242  See supra note 124 and accompanying text.   
 243  See Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at1328.   
 244  Id.  
 245  Id. at 1324.   
 246  Id. at 1327; contra Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 
1990) (holding that a party is indispensable on the ground that any relief would result 
in reallocation of the share of the party who had properly invoked sovereign 
immunity).   
 247  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1328.   
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ii. If the factors do not weigh in favor of indispensability, 
there is no logical reason for UMass officers to be 
joined 
Even accepting the majority’s conclusion that UMass need not be 
joined as an indispensable party for UUtah to receive adequate relief, 
the majority fails to consider the shortcomings of permitting joinder 
of UMass officials.248  In Cahill, the alleged injury occurred as a result 
of the state officials’ actions, and the relief sought would come in the 
form of an injunction preventing the officials’ enforcement of the New 
York law at issue.249  Thus, the effect of the judgment would operate 
directly against the officials in the form of an injunction.  In Max-
Planck, the officials named as parties have no ownership interest in the 
patent (nor any economic stake).250  The officials named are in no way 
central to the controversy at issue, nor are they in a position to provide 
any form of relief other than straw-man standing, so that UMass might 
be bound despite not being party to a suit (in violation of a 
fundamental tenant of due process that a court may not bind a non-
party).  Further, by permitting such joinder, the majority has ruled in 
contravention of the express direction of the Supreme Court in 
Cunningham.251 
D. Possible Solutions without Misapplying the Law 
The majority in Max-Planck is undoubtedly driven by the policy 
concern that, if left to the Supreme Court, disputes between state 
universities over patent rights will go unheard.252  While this policy 
concern is well-founded, incorrectly interpreting the plain meaning of 
a statute by conflating and misreading Supreme Court precedent will 
undoubtedly cause more harm than good over time.253  Already, the 
 
 248  Id.   
 249  Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2000).   
 250  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1329. 
 251  See Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 457 (1883) (“In 
Cunningham the Court held that the plaintiffs could not bring suit against the 
governor, who had no personal interest in the matter, in “an attempt to make the state 
of Georgia a party to the suit through the defendant as governor, so as to bind the 
state by the judgment and decision of the court in case.”). 
 252  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1328 (citing LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 157 
(10th ed. 2010)) (observing that, of the 70 cases the Court heard in the 2007 term, 
only one fell under the Court’s original jurisdiction).   
 253  See Cahill, 217 F.3d at 105 (Sotomayor, C.J., dissenting) (“As a policy matter, I 
do not disagree that this creative approach to §1251(a) makes the resolution of 
seemingly less weight disputes between States more efficient, faster, and thus likely 
more desirable for the States and, perhaps, the busy Supreme Court as well.  But the 
majority’s interpretation of §1251(a) is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute . . . 
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effect of Cahill’s decision to make an end-run around § 1251(a) is 
observable in the Max-Planck majority’s application of three distinct 
tests, two of which are substantially identical, amidst a conflated 
framework that injects the Supreme Court’s discretionary authority 
analysis into determining a “real party at interest.” 
i. The Supreme Court can articulate that lower courts are 
permitted to determine what is “appropriate” and 
then articulate an appropriate test 
The most direct way to alter the statutory interpretation to permit 
jurisdiction over “inferior suits” between the states would be for the 
Supreme Court to make a pronouncement on the matter.  While the 
Court has already taken a position on the issue in Maryland v. 
Louisiana, perhaps Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is more compelling in 
an increasingly technology driven world.254  The Court might then 
articulate a uniform analysis for limiting its own original jurisdiction 
such that inferior cases between the states might be heard in the lower 
federal courts. 
If the Court does not desire to go so far as to consider Maryland v. 
Louisiana, a “remnant of abandoned doctrine,” lower courts would be 
well-served to have the correct analysis for determining a “real party at 
interest” articulated before a circuit split inevitably develops.  Under 
the current statutory framework, Judge Sotomayor’s analysis is quite 
clearly correct (and, by extension, the majority in UUtah’s 
“mandatory” or “indispensable” framework is permissible as it arrives 
at Pennhurst, substantially the same place as Sotomayor’s analysis).255  
Practically, it is also the clearest analysis, cutting directly to the heart 
of the “real party at interest” issue without any need for surplusage. 
ii. The legislature can make an exception for patent 
disputes 
Another way to handle the conflict between the statutory 
language and policy concerns would be for the legislature to enact an 
exception (particularly for patents which are undoubtedly a state 
property interest).  While the Max-Planck majority’s reliance on Cahill, 
which subsequently depends upon an extension of the spirit of Ex parte 
Young, may have been suitable for cases enjoining officers of a state, it 
stretches a bit too far in attempting to allow officers to be joined for 
 
and depends upon a questionable reading of Supreme Court precedent.”).  
 254  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 255  See supra note 189 and accompanying text; see also supra note 200 and 
accompanying text.   
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property matters.  Although equipped with no statutorily legitimate 
way of doing so, the Max-Planck majority’s instinct to attempt to fit the 
dispute under the § 1251(b)(3) exception is not an unreasonable one.  
As a matter of expediency, a new exception (substantially similar to § 
1251(b)(3) in that it could create original but not exclusive 
jurisdiction over a claim) would allow lower courts to hear disputes 
unlikely to be heard by the Supreme Court, while permitting the 
legislature to narrowly tailor the new exception, perhaps even only to 
patents and/or commercial state activity (thus retaining exclusive 
jurisdiction over cases where “core sovereign interests” are at issue). 
iii. Dr. Bass and UUtah can be required to protect their 
rights by filing a patent and then provoking an 
interference proceeding at the USPTO 
Finally, as Judge Moore notes in Max-Planck, the USPTO could 
require state universities to first file a patent and then provoke an 
interference proceeding at the USPTO.256  This would likely only “kick 
the can down the road,” however, as any escalation to a district court 
would once again result in the same problem at issue. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While the court’s efforts to hear Max-Planck are noble as a matter 
of public policy, the Federal Circuit’s analysis is quite obviously 
problematic.  As an initial matter, it requires ignoring proper statutory 
interpretation and conflating two distinct analyses: the Supreme 
Court’s exercise of discretion and the determination of a “real party at 
interest.”  It then compounds the issue by binding a non-party to the 
judgment through a set of straw-men who have no direct interest in the 
suit whatsoever. 
Looking past the merits, the legal implications of the Federal 
Circuit’s decision are problematic as well.  Another court reading the 
analysis will likely find it difficult to determine which of the three 
analyses should be employed in determining if a case is “appropriate” 
and therefore obligatory on the Supreme Court, or whether it is 
permissible for the lower court to exercise jurisdiction.  Further, it is 
unclear whether a lower court even has the authority to make such a 





 256  Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1331 n.2.   
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Undoubtedly, the uncertainty arises from the opinion because, in 
fact, only the Supreme Court has the authority to determine whether 
or not to exercise discretion.  Similarly, the invented analysis of the 
majority is logically tenuous at best, leading to a standard which is both 
haphazard and repetitious.  Such analysis inevitably results in a 
decision that defies even its own logic and creates a situation in which 
an action is permitted to proceed in the absence of patent owners 
whose ownership stake is at issue. 
To rectify the issue at hand, either the Supreme Court, or the 
legislature through statutory amendment, needs to create an 
exception whereby patent disputes over ownership can be vindicated 
between state universities in lower courts without burdening the 
Supreme Court’s docket and without flouting the central legal 
principles of precedent and statutory interpretation. 
 
